- 141 - Pacific War Podcast - Battle of Sansapor July 30 - August 5, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Last time we spoke about invasion of Guam and Tinian. Japanese forces, led by General Obata on Guam and Colonel Ogata on Tinian, prepared defenses with trenches, pillboxes, and artillery. The Americans bombarded these defenses extensively. Despite resistance, they successfully landed on Guam and Tinian, securing beachheads. Intense fighting ensued, with Marines facing heavy casualties. Despite Japanese counterattacks, American forces gradually expanded their footholds, leading to the eventual containment of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula. The Japanese launched a fierce assault against Marine positions on Guam, engaging in close combat with heavy casualties on both sides. Despite initial success, the Japanese offensive was repelled by intense artillery and machine-gun fire, leaving the remaining enemy forces to defend Orote Peninsula. On Tinian, after extensive naval bombardment, Marines landed successfully, repelling Japanese counterattacks and establishing a beachhead. Despite heavy Japanese casualties, the Marines suffered relatively few losses, ultimately breaking the enemy's resistance.

This episode is the Battle of Sansapor

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Following the successful capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies possessed ample air and supply bases to advance to the Vogelkop Peninsula, fulfilling General MacArthur's aim of establishing a vital airbase supporting further operations northwestward, potentially towards Mindanao or via Halmahera. Initially considering Manokwari as a non-critical objective, MacArthur's plan centered on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island for crucial supply and air bases in New Guinea. However, the rapid pace of Pacific theater operations raised doubts about the feasibility of bringing the Klamono oilfields into production before the war's end, prompting the cancellation of exploitation plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs assumed responsibility for the direction and coordination of oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies and undertook necessary liaison with British and Dutch agencies. By mid-February 1943 they had decided that military units would at least start all oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to civilian agencies. MacArthur was instructed to plan the location and timing details of oil rehabilitation projects in the Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum production and refining units begin. The requisite troops, most of them US Army engineers and many especially recruited from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also placed with manufacturers for the special production and refining equipment, which was sent to California as it was obtained. While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had become obvious that in accordance with MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Klamono oil was especially valuable in that it could be used as fuel for naval vessels without refining beyond a little "topping" to remove excess naphtha. With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced and topped as necessary much nearer to the scene of combat.

With the oilfields no longer a priority and aerial surveys indicating unsuitable conditions for airstrips on Waigeo, MacArthur opted for ground reconnaissance of the Mar-Sansapor area. This exploration revealed promising landing beaches and potential airfield sites, albeit requiring significant effort to develop. Consequently, MacArthur directed Alamo Force to secure the lightly-defended Sansapor-Mar area instead of Sorong-Waigeo, scheduling a landing for July 30. General Krueger tasked General Sibert’s 6th Division with Operation Typhoon, designating the 20th Regiment at Wakde-Sarmi as reserve and arranging relief by Major-General John Persons’ 31st Division.

Admiral Fechteler’s Task Force 77 had devised a strategy: to deploy Colonel Forbie Privett’s 1st Regiment, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, onto the Red Beaches northeast of Mar. Concurrently, Sibert’s 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was tasked with securing Middleburg Island. Following the landings, airfields were to be constructed at these sites. The subsequent phase involved Privett’s 3rd Battalion executing a shore-to-shore movement to establish a PT base on Sansapor’s Green Beach, scheduled for the day after the initial landings.

To set this plan in motion, the 31st Division commenced unloading operations at Maffin Bay on July 14 and successfully relieved Sibert’s units four days later. The two regimental combat teams of the 31st Division, the 155th and the 167th, which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no previous combat experience but received much valuable training in a series of patrol actions, company-sized scouting missions, and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive to drive the Japanese from a main line of resistance which they had established in the low hills between Metimedan Creek and Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity for committing many troops to the defense of that area made it impossible to assemble sufficient strength for such an attack. Then, by the time the 6th Division's requirements had been met, the 31st Division itself had to begin preparations for another operation. The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter. Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt. C.J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on at the Maffin Bay staging area; and during the period July 18-August 31 a daily average of 2,500 tons of various supplies was unloaded at the bay. During the same period the 31st Division lost 39 men killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3 missing. The division in turn killed 294 Japanese, found 497 dead, and captured 14 others.

However, the deployment of the 6th Division faced delays due to heavy congestion in the Wakde-Sarmi area. It wasn’t until July 27 that Sibert’s combat units began departing from Maffin Bay towards Sansapor. Maintaining the element of surprise was paramount to General Krueger, hence no preliminary naval or air bombardment was conducted in the Sansapor-Mar area. Instead, General Kenney’s aircraft targeted Japanese bases at Manokwari, Sorong, and the Halmahera-Ceram-Ambon region.

To further deceive the Japanese, Fechteler’s convoy took a circuitous route to approach Sansapor, apparently arriving undetected around 05:00 on July 30. As anticipated, no opposition was encountered, and the first wave successfully landed at 07:01. While Privett’s troops swiftly unloaded on the mainland, one LST proceeded toward Middleburg Island. By 07:30, it began deploying the amtracs carrying the reinforced 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which safely landed by 08:00. Encountering no resistance, the island was promptly secured, and the troop regrouped before setting sail for nearby Amsterdam Island, which was also secured unopposed by 11:30.

Upon returning to the mainland, following the incident where three unarmed Japanese were killed, Privett’s 2nd Battalion proceeded inland and eastward. They successfully established defenses along low hills roughly 800 yards from the shore. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion encountered challenges navigating through dense jungle undergrowth. At 07:40, the 3rd Battalion landed and moved west along the beach to the Wewe River mouth, preparing for the next day's advance to Sansapor. By nightfall, all units were ashore, securing the desired beachhead perimeter. The following day, Privett’s 3rd Battalion embarked for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor, meeting no resistance upon landing at 08:44. They then proceeded south along the beach to secure Sansapor Plantation and Village by 10:00. While Cape Sansapor proved unsuitable for the planned PT boat base due to reef-bound shorelines and poor beaches, Amsterdam Island emerged as a promising alternative location. Subsequent operations in the Sansapor-Mar area involved patrolling to eliminate scattered Japanese groups, expanding the beachhead, and safeguarding airfield installations. A significant event occurred on August 3 when 92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan troops were captured at a Japanese hospital near Cape Opmarai. Concurrently, General Anami acknowledged the untenable positions on the northeastern Vogelkop and General Ikeda’s 35th Division abandoned Manokwari on July 16, embarking on a challenging overland march towards Sorong with limited supplies. Around the same time, General Teshima’s headquarters at Manokwari and other small garrisons in the region commenced an overland journey to Windehsi.

By August 15, as units of the 35th Division approached the Kor River, the 63rd Regiment moved into the vicinity, engaging in skirmishes with retreating Japanese forces. In these encounters, they eliminated 17 enemy combatants and captured 4. By August 31, the 63rd Regiment had further success, neutralizing 155 Japanese soldiers and capturing an additional 42, with minimal losses on their own side: 3 soldiers killed and 4 wounded. Similarly, patrols from the 1st Regiment on the western flank encountered retreating Japanese forces, resulting in the elimination of 197 enemies and the capture of 154, with only 4 soldiers wounded by the end of August. The total casualties for the Typhoon Task Force amounted to 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured, while they managed to account for 385 Japanese and Formosans killed and 215 captured. Ikeda’s division remnants reached Sorong on August 25 after enduring a grueling 40-day march. Additionally, construction of the Middleburg strip was successfully completed by August 14, and the Mar Drome was slated to be operational by September 3 to accommodate Kenney’s fighters and medium bombers.

Transitioning to Tinian, following the successful landing on July 24 and the subsequent destruction of the Japanese counterattacking force, General Schmidt's primary objectives for July 25 included landing the 2nd Marine Division and expanding the beachhead. While General Watson’s Marines disembarked swiftly, General Cates’ 4th Marine Division initiated their advance at 10:00. Colonel Jones’ 23rd Marines navigated through dense canefields and underbrush along the coast beyond the O-1 Line. Colonel Batchelder’s 25th Marines executed an enveloping maneuver against Mount Maga, securing its summit after intense combat supported by mortars and tanks. Colonel Hart’s 24th Marines swiftly moved south and eastward, reaching the O-2 Line.

Upon arrival, Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines assumed control of the far left flank and proceeded slowly through the rugged coastal terrain and dense undergrowth toward Ushi Point. Following the successful capture of a Japanese stronghold, the Marines advanced unopposed, advancing 200 yards past O-2 swiftly. However, the day brought hardship for the 14th Marines, facing heavy counter-battery fire resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers killed and 22 wounded. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force of the western Carolines and launched a third raid on the Volcano-Bonin Islands to thwart enemy bomber interference, resulting in the destruction of five ships, damage to others, and the loss of 13 enemy planes for only 16 aircraft lost. The next day, Schmidt's undermanned divisions, later reinforced with 1782 replacements to fill Saipan-related gaps, commenced the advance to the O-3 Line. While the 23rd Marines steadily advanced with minimal resistance towards the vicinity of the O-4 Line, the bolstered 25th Marines cleared Mount Maga and, securing the summit of Mount Lasso, advanced into the O-4A Line virtually unchallenged. Meanwhile, the 8th Marines rapidly secured the Ushi Point flats and its airfield, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced eastward, securing Asiga Point upon reaching the east coast by 12:30, and Colonel Riseley's 6th Marines, after landing, pushed southward to establish a line abreast of the 2nd Marines.

On July 27 and 28, encountering minimal opposition, the Marines advanced southward in a concerted effort, with riflemen in formation and skirmishers leading the way. The NTLF G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey came to a conservative conclusion on July 27 that summarized not only that day's enemy situation but the entire operation's enemy situation as well: “Without saying so, he seemed to indicate the importance of all units conducting aggressive patrolling far to the front: To date there have been no indications that our front line units have encountered the 50th Infantry Regiment in force [since the first night's counterattacks]. It is believed that this unit is largely intact and it is known that they are well equipped and seasoned troops. They are capable of intervention at any time and may be expected to offer a strong opposition when encountered.” In the same report, Yancey noted that the "most likely enemy capability" was: "To fight a delaying action, withdrawing to, and organizing further defenses in, the high ground in the southeastern end of the island." Faced with this enigmatic enemy situation, General Schmidt formulated his scheme of maneuver and assigned his objectives on July 27 and 28 to facilitate an irregular "elbowing" advance. From the front lines held on the morning of July 27, Objective O-4 was near for the 4th Division, far for the 2nd Division; once Objective O-4 had been reached, the emphasis would shift--Objective O-5 would be near for the 2nd Division, far for the 4th Division. The Corps' attack on these two days, then, would find the 2nd Division carrying the ball on July 27, the 4th Division on the 28th. On the first day the 2nd Division would push forward at 07:30, the 4th Division at 10:00; on the second day the 4th Division would attack at 07:00, the 2nd Division at 10:00. Variations in these attack hours were consistent with plans to punch first with the left, then with the right. Principal advantage of this arrangement was that the bulk of the supporting fires could be allotted first to one division, then to the other. Not only did the 14th Corps Artillery mass its fires to support the main effort, but two 105mm howitzer battalions of the division executing the secondary attack were also made available to support the principal thrust in each case.

Despite the gradual progress made by Cates’ Marines as they secured key positions on higher terrain, they successfully reached the O-4 Line by the end of the first day. Simultaneously, Watson’s Marines made significant strides on more favorable terrain, aided by tanks, covering a distance of 4000 yards to also reach the O-4 Line. The following day, amidst worsening weather conditions, the 2nd and 6th Marines quickly moved forward to secure the O-5 Line. The weather at Tinian had been unpleasant. Nearly every day featured rain squalls, gusty winds, and ominous clouds. And yet, for Jig-Day and three days following, the seas remained calm enough for reasonably convenient shore activities. The "three days of good weather" that Admiral Hill had considered vital had already expired. On the afternoon of 28 July the weather got worse--much worse. This condition resulted from the effects of a typhoon that built up west of the Marianas and sent its swells and winds against Tinian's west coast. The seas surrounding Tinian changed to a dirty gray-blue as the winds mounted and the waves boiled over one another and grew into larger, uglier masses. Surf roaring against the tiny WHITE Beaches and their rocky flanking shelves forced temporary suspension, at 1800 on 28 July, of all unloading over the beaches.

On the left flank, after intense artillery bombardment, Cates’ Marines swiftly advanced to the O-5 Line, then, supported by naval forces, resumed their march to secure Gurguan Point and its airfield, advancing to the intermediate O-6A Line, with Jones’ 23rd Marines covering a total distance of 7300 yards. On July 29, with half of the island under control, Schmidt directed his forces to push beyond the O-6 Line. Accordingly, the 24th and 25th Marines advanced with minimal resistance and reached the O-6 Line. Although Watson’s Marines faced initially light opposition, resistance intensified as they crossed the O-6 Line. The 6th Marines managed to secure advantageous positions just shy of the intermediate O-7A Line, while the 2nd Marines encountered opposition around the Masalog Point hill, halting their progress. The next day, Cates’ Marines resumed their southward advance, encountering resistance from Japanese machine-gunners and riflemen entrenched in coastal caves.

While tanks engaged the enemy, the 24th and 25th Marines surged forward, effectively securing Tinian Town and its airfield, and eventually reaching the O-7 Line. On the right flank, Watson’s Marines also pressed southward, with the 2nd Marines swiftly securing Masalog Hill and advancing along the coast despite heavy machine-gun fire, reaching O-7, while the 6th Marines advanced against sporadic resistance, also reaching O-7. Additionally, the 8th Marines took position at the center of the corps’ line. With the capture of four-fifths of the island and over 3000 Japanese either killed or captured, Schmidt’s Marines successfully pushed the remaining Japanese forces under Colonel Ogata’s command into an unnamed ridge between Lalo and Marpo Points at Tinian's southern end.

On July 31, following a massive artillery, air, and naval barrage, the Marines launched another assault to the south. The 24th Marines made significant progress along the coast and on less steep cliffs, securing the road to the ridge top. The 23rd Marines faced stiffer resistance but advanced with remarkable discipline, aided by tanks, gaining high ground. On the right flank, the 2nd and 6th Marines advanced against light machine-gun and mortar fire, reaching the intermediate O-8A Line. In the center, the 8th Marines encountered stronger resistance but managed to establish a foothold on the zigzag road to the top. By nightfall, a 600-yard gap emerged between the 8th and 23rd Marines, which the Japanese could exploit.

At 23:00, a banzai charge was repelled; however, at 01:00 on August 1, a 150-man force blocked Wallace’s rear road and launched an attack. A counterattack force was quickly organized, driving back the enemy. Ogata's final banzai charge at 05:15 was directed at the left of Company E but failed to breach Marine defenses. Both Colonel Wallace and the enemy commander probably still Colonel Ogata had realized the tactical implications of the cliff-line penetration. Both knew that it provided a route over which thousands of Marines could move into the Japanese rear. The two commanders' reactions were classic. As soon as one of his battalions grasped a toe hold, Wallace exploited the success by committing his reserve there. The enemy commander, as soon as he received word of the penetration, ordered a counterattack to throw the Marines off the cliff and restore the position. Each selected a tactically sound course of action. Only one could be successful.

At dawn, as the Japanese began to withdraw, Cates’ Marines continued the attack southward, with the 24th Marines reaching the O-8 Line at Lalo Point, and the 23rd Marines, after encountering a sheer cliff, retracing their steps to reach the cliffline in front of O-8. On the right flank, the 8th Marines swiftly advanced to O-8A and moved alongside the 6th Marines toward the cliffs overlooking the water. Finally, the 2nd Marines secured the high ground to prevent enemy escape along the east coast. Despite not reaching Marpo Point, organized resistance crumbled, leading Schmidt to declare Tinian secure at 18:55.

Organized resistance had ceased. But on the early morning of August 2, an enemy force–estimated variously from 100 to 250–struck headlong into the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. Headquarters personnel, armed for the most part with carbines and pistols (although two automatic rifles were also used), considered the enemy group very well "organized." Initially, personnel of the aid station bore the brunt, but soon everyone in the headquarters group–clerks, communicators, corpsmen, assault engineers, mortarmen, and staff personnel–rallied behind their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Easley, to defend themselves. The Japanese, carrying rifles, grenades, and machine guns, hurled themselves at the Marines with characteristic violence. As soon as one fell, another took his place. In search of substantial assistance, Captain John R. Steinstra, Headquarters Company commander, dashed to the nearby Company F, 6th Marines, acquired a medium tank and a rifle platoon, and led them back to the fight. Here was welcome reinforcement to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Group, which had fought the enemy at close quarters for over two hours. The machine barged into the battle with guns blazing, and the tide turned. The battalion executive officer later stated that he considered the tank's appearance "vitally important" to the outcome. Those enemy soldiers who remained on their feet hastily departed the area. Daylight made results of the enemy effort visible: 119 Japanese bodies lay almost side by side in and around the 3rd Battalion command post. But the Marines had also taken casualties, one of the dead being Colonel Easley.

Nearly 400 Japanese perished in the week following the island's capture. From August 7 onward, the 8th Marines conducted cleanup operations on Tinian until January 1, 1945, eliminating an additional 542 Japanese at the cost of 38 killed and 125 wounded. Throughout the Battle of Tinian, a total of 5,745 Japanese were killed and 404 captured, while American losses amounted to 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. Similar to Saipan, around 4,000 civilians either took their own lives or were killed, but unlike Saipan, the majority—approximately 13,000 civilians—were interned.

On April 15, 1944, there were 16,029 civilians residing on Tinian, out of which 1,658, primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly, were relocated to Japan prior to the American invasion. Approximately 2,610 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Journalist Robert Sherrod observed that most casualties occurred due to direct combat, as the Americans heavily utilized artillery, aerial bombardment, and naval attacks, often forcing civilians to seek refuge alongside soldiers. Some perished from diseases, thirst, or hunger. Tragically, some were also victims of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, such as being tied together and attacked with grenades. Instances of mass suicide occurred, notably at the "Suicide Cliff," where parents threw their children off the 120-foot precipice, and some civilians were pushed by Japanese soldiers. According to a captured Japanese soldier, a large group willingly perished in caves at the military's behest. By August 1, only 2,468 civilians had been documented, but within three days, this number surged to 8,491. The 2nd Marine Division established a camp for civilians at Ushi Point Airfield, while the 4th Marine Division set up another at the ruins of Churo village, which became a permanent settlement for all displaced civilians. By October 15, Camp Churo housed 10,926 civilians, comprising mainly Japanese and Korean nationals, with nearly half being children under 15 years old. The military administration struggled to provide adequate care due to shortages of relief supplies. Seabees oversaw the construction of temporary shelters initially, which were later replaced by more durable structures using salvaged materials. The internees also supplemented their provisions by salvaging food and cultivating gardens, with Seabees stepping in to provide improvised diesel stoves as firewood became scarce. In late 1945, Admiral Spruance, who succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians, a process completed by late 1946.

Shifting focus to Guam, by July 25, General Geiger's Marines had secured two beachhead areas, with General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division advancing on the Fonte Plateau and General Shepherd's brigade sealing off the Orote Peninsula. Despite a fierce enemy counterattack on both fronts, Japanese resistance was effectively shattered. On July 26, while mop-up operations continued in General Turnage's sector, General Shepherd's Marines prepared to assault Orote. Following coordinated air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the 4th Marines launched their attack at 07:00, making swift progress. However, the 22nd Marines faced delays due to enemy artillery fire, necessitating the 4th Marines to extend their line to cover the exposed flank. Although the mangrove swamp hindered Colonel Schneider's Marines, they successfully cleared the area by afternoon, establishing contact with Colonel Shapley's forces at RJ 15, albeit with a slight eastern bend in their line. Meanwhile, Shepherd's units encountered mines, pillboxes, and bunkers, halting their advance by nightfall.

On the morning of July 27th, the offensive recommenced, yet the 4th Marines encountered difficulties in penetrating the robust enemy defenses without tank support. However, once the mines were cleared, the Shermans neutralized enemy positions, enabling the Marines to take control of the ridge ahead, although they couldn't advance further through the coconut grove. Meanwhile, the 22nd Marines, moving alongside Shapley’s 3rd Battalion along the inland road, faced delays due to the swamp. They encountered numerous obstacles including pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and mines near the old Marine Barracks. Remarkably, the determined enemy abandoned their fortified line around 5:00 PM after a substantial bombardment, allowing Schneider’s Marines to swiftly advance ahead of the 4th Marines and seize strategic terrain by nightfall.

Following another intense bombardment, Shepherd’s forces prepared to attack on July 28th. Despite Japanese resistance, Schneider’s tank-supported advance reached the O-4 Line by 10:05 AM, creating a significant gap between Marine regiments. Nonetheless, the 22nd Marines persisted, fighting through the Marine Barracks and halting just 100 yards east of Sumay. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines faced slow progress and fierce opposition, stopping within 150 yards of the airfield. On June 29th, Shepherd launched a final assault after yet another heavy barrage, with both regiments successfully advancing the entire length of the airstrip against minimal resistance, establishing a defensive line 150 yards beyond the strip by 2:00 PM.

As the 22nd Marines redirected their efforts to clean up the devastated Sumay area, effectively eliminating the last remaining enemy stronghold the next day, the 4th Marines continued their advance northward, with a combined tank and infantry patrol reaching the tip of the peninsula. With the peninsula now under control, the American flag was once again raised over the ruins of the Marine Barracks.General Shepherd proclaimed “On this hallowed ground, you officers and men of the 1st Marine Brigade have avenged the loss of our comrades who were overcome by the numerically superior enemy three days after Pearl Harbor.” Orote saw over 2500 Japanese casualties, while Marine losses amounted to 115 killed, 721 wounded, and 38 missing.

Moving northward, following a failed Japanese counterattack, Takashina’s forces were preparing to retreat further into the island's interior, but the Americans were relentless in their pursuit. After regrouping and subjecting the enemy to heavy bombardment, battalions from Turnage’s regiments launched an assault towards the Fonte Plateau on July 27, albeit encountering stubborn resistance from the still-active enemy. Meanwhile, Colonel Butler’s 3rd Battalion successfully advanced to the D-2 Line on the same day. Following successful defense against several small-scale enemy counterattacks overnight, Turnage initiated the main push towards the objective beachhead line on the morning of July 28.

The depleted 3rd Marines, with Colonel Craig’s 2nd Battalion attached, launched another assault, encountering minimal resistance and securing the D-3 Line by afternoon, thereby completely controlling the abandoned Fonte area. Further bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 307th Regiment, the 9th Marines made progress in their attack towards the strategic Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo ridgeline, marking a significant initial victory. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment, supported by units from the 305th Regiment, advanced towards Mount Tenjo from the south.

Under the protective cover of artillery neutralization fire, Craig’s 3rd Battalion effectively demolished a concrete emplacement at the center of Mount Chachao’s summit and swiftly secured the beachhead line adjacent to Mount Alutom. Simultaneously, General Bruce’s infantry units swiftly captured Mount Tenjo, with Craig’s 1st Battalion joining them by day's end. The 21st Marines faced minimal resistance, eliminating remaining enemy pockets around the radio towers and reaching the designated beachhead line. Thus, Turnage’s attack objectives were achieved, extending the beachhead line across the entire front. Additionally, the 21st Marines overran the 29th Division command post near the Fonte River, resulting in Takashina's demise as he supervised his retreating units. Consequently, General Obata assumed direct command of the remaining forces, adhering to Takashina’s plan for a strategic withdrawal to Mount Santa Rosa, with delaying positions established at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. The Japanese launched eleven localized counterattacks against Turnage’s beachhead line on July 29, all of which were successfully repelled, inflicting 800 casualties on the attackers. The 3rd Marine Division then focused on consolidation and reorganization for the remainder of the day while rear areas were cleared of enemy presence. In the meantime, as the 306th Regiment secured the unoccupied Mounts Alifan and Taene, Bruce had also dispatched several patrols to the southern end of the island since July 27, successfully discovering by the end of July that the sector had been completely abandoned.

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The allies chose to focus on the Vogelkop Peninsula over the Klamono oilfields, as MacArthur's focus shifted to the Mar-Sansapor region for airfield development. The Marines faced a horror show in Tinian but managed to secure her while progress was made on Guam. The Americans were clawing ever closer to the Japanese home islands.