‘We need eyes and ears’. How the Russian military uses pro-war Telegram channels to recruit people in Europe to spy on NATO and Ukraine
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For the past six months, several pro-war Telegram channels have been calling on Russian-speaking residents of Europe to spy on NATO military sites and report their findings through a special bot. Recruits are instructed to photograph military bases and purchase local maps, guidebooks, and SIM cards to send to Russia. To uncover who’s behind the operation and how it works, a Novaya Gazeta Europe journalist posed as a potential recruit. Here’s what they discovered.
Each month, information about a bot where residents of Europe and Ukraine can report the “locations of enemy military facilities” is shared on a Telegram channel dedicated to “supporting participants of the special military operation from Crimea.” “If you’re ready to help, we’ll instruct you on what to do,” reads one message. “We need eyes and ears in Ukraine and across Europe.”
The group itself is small, with only a few thousand members, but its posts are frequently shared in larger groups and chats, reaching tens of thousands of users. Most often, they’re reposted by a Telegram user known as KS.
According to Novaya Gazeta Europe’s investigation, this alias belongs to Ksenia Temnik, the head of the legal department at Crimea’s military enlistment office. Temnik, who received a Russian passport in April 2014, shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has held various roles in the region’s occupation administration in the years since. She was awarded a medal marking the fifth anniversary of Crimea’s annexation and also administers several pro-war Z-groups on Telegram.
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‘Let’s start small’
A Novaya Gazeta Europe journalist contacted the bot mentioned in the announcement, posing as a European resident willing to help. The bot responded within 30 minutes, asking for their city of residence and whether their workplace had any ties to military enterprises.
The journalist was instructed to send photos and videos of NATO military operations. “During your travels, you might spot equipment movements or identify the locations of military facilities. We’re particularly interested in the transfer and storage of equipment, as well as sites where Ukrainian specialists are being trained,” the bot operator explained. They asked the journalist to purchase maps and guidebooks from every country they visited — “the more detailed the scale, the better” — and look into buying SIM cards that could be activated locally and sent to Russia through acquaintances.
The bot operator emphasized the importance of monitoring activity near the Belarusian border, where they suspected there might be concentrations of NATO troops. They also sought information about security measures, fencing, and the placement of military units and equipment at facilities, as well as the presence of foreign specialists and their vehicles. “It’s all very individualized. Let’s see what you can safely do from the list I’ve outlined,” they said, adding, “I’ve given you the main areas to focus on.”
According to the operator, the individuals communicating with informants through the bot serve in Russia’s Airborne Forces. When asked directly why the information was needed and whether it would be used for sabotage, they replied, “Let’s start small — with information.”
damaged cables
The operator also provided safety tips: delete photos immediately after sending, clear compromising chats, avoid discussing support for Russia, and create a plausible story to explain any interest in targeted sites. If anything went wrong, they promised to “do everything in our power” to help, though they didn’t specify what kind of assistance they would provide. They also asked for personal details “so we know who to extract.”
To verify the bot’s connection to the Russian army, the journalist — posing as a potential volunteer — contacted Ksenia Temnik and asked if she could confirm that Russian military personnel were indeed behind the bot. Temnik replied: “Yes, they’re definitely our guys.”
Sabotage and arson
Over the past year, authorities in several European Union countries have accused Russian intelligence of orchestrating sabotage on their soil. In Estonia, more than a dozen individuals were arrested and charged with carrying out orders from Russian operatives. The allegations included desecrating national monuments and targeting the property of public officials and journalists.
In Latvia, individuals were reportedly recruited to spy on a NATO airbase and commit acts of vandalism in military barracks. According to journalists from Re:Baltica, the recruitment was conducted via Telegram. Two men in Latvia are also currently on trial for attempting to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia.
In April 2024, German prosecutors announced the arrest of two individuals with dual Russian and German citizenship on suspicion of planning arson attacks and bombings at industrial and military sites. And back in 2023, the Polish authorities arrested a group accused of planning to sabotage trains carrying weapons and supplies to Ukraine, allegedly acting on Russian orders.
This past September, journalists with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) reported on a similar Telegram bot used to recruit saboteurs. At that time, those operating the bot were more explicit in their goals, openly encouraging journalists posing as recruits to commit serious crimes — including arson, sabotage, and even murder. Telegram later confirmed that the bot had been blocked.
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