CD297: The Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump

Congressional Dish

When Congress returned to work after the Republican National Convention, the House held three hearings investigating the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. In this episode, hear for yourself the facts presented by the Director of the Secret Service, the Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, and the FBI Director during their 15 hours of testimony. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: [e-mail] Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or [e-mail] Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Cheatle’s Failures Rep. James Comer and Rep. Jamie Raskin. July 22, 2024. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability. Julia Reinstein et al. July 16, 2024. ABC News. Would-be Assassin Emily Cochrane et al. July 19, 2024. The New York Times. Bernd Debusmann et al. July 19, 2024. BBC. Gaza Death Toll Rasha Khatib. July 20, 2024. The Lancet, Volume 404, Issue 10449. Audio Sources July 24, 2024 House Committee on the Judiciary Witnesses: Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Clips Time stamps correspond to C-SPAN version 31:20 Christopher Wray: I'm told that the father purchased the firearm in 2013, so quite a while ago, and then he sold it to his son in October of 2023. 43:05 Christopher Wray: The reason why I've talked about how we think he got on the roof is that's based our evidence response to forensic analysis. Without getting into all the details, footprints, fingerprints, et cetera, that we can see how he got on. But we don't have an eyewitness at the moment who saw him climbing up. 43:25 Christopher Wray: A few minutes before the shooting, local law enforcement saw him on the roof. Again, no weapon identified at that point. A few seconds before the shooting is when the law enforcement officer that I've talked about already, the one who was assisted by another officer who saw up on the roof, saw the shooter in a prone shooting position with the gun. He turns… Rep. Barry Moore (R-AL): How long did that happen before? Christopher Wray: That sighting, that is the first time, to my knowledge, the first time anybody from law enforcement saw him with a weapon. That is seconds before he shot at President Trump. July 24, 2024 House Committee on the Judiciary Witnesses: Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Clips Time stamps correspond to C-SPAN version 25:30 Christopher Wray: We have recovered eight cartridges on the roof. 28:05 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Have you developed any evidence to so suggest that there are any accomplices or cooperators or assisters? Christopher Wray: Not at this time, but again, the investigation is ongoing. 36:10 Christopher Wray: So we have recovered a drone that the shooter appears to have used. It's being exploited and analyzed by the FBI lab. The drone was recovered in his vehicle, so at the time of the shooting, the drone was in his vehicle with the controller. In addition, our investigation has uncovered -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Do you know what time of day he flew it and if he flew it on the day of the shooting? Christopher Wray: So in addition, it appears that around 3:50-4:00PM, in that window, on the day of the shooting, that the shooter was flying the drone around the area. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Two hours before? Christopher Wray: I want to be clear about when I say the area, not over the stage and that part of the area itself, but I would say about 200 yards, give or take, away from that, we think, but we do not know. So again, this is one of these things that's qualified because of our ongoing review, that he was live streaming, viewing the footage from that. Again, about 11 minutes and around the 3:50-4:00 PM range. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Two hours before, he's flying a drone in the vicinity of the rally. Christopher Wray: About 200 yards away, yes. 37:25 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): What about the bombs that we've heard about in the shooter's car? Christopher Wray: So again, the FBI lab is exploiting those explosive devices. We've recovered three devices, two in his vehicle and one back in his residence. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Are these what your experts would call sophisticated operations? I dunno. That's what I've been told by people who have some understanding of this area. Christopher Wray: Yeah, I think we've seen more sophisticated and less, I would say these are relatively, again, keyword relatively, crude devices themselves, but they did have the ability to be detonated remotely. And so to that point, in addition to the two devices that we recovered out of his vehicle, there were receivers for those two explosive devices with the devices. And then on the shooter himself, when he was killed by law enforcement, he had a transmitter with him. Now, I do want to add one important point here. At the moment, it looks to us, again, ongoing review, and I can't say that too many times, at the moment, it looks like because of the off position on the receivers, that if he had tried to detonate those devices from the roof, it would not have worked. But that doesn't mean the explosives weren't dangerous. 1:23:00 Christopher Wray: I think it's fair to say that we do not yet have a clear picture of his motive. 1:25:30 Christopher Wray: We located a number of firearms associated with the shooter and his family. I think it was a total of, I think 14 in the house. The weapon that he used for the attempted assassination was an AR-style rifle that was purchased legally that he, its my understanding, acquired, I think bought actually from his father, who was the one who originally bought it, again, legally. 1:46:20 Christopher Wray: So we do know that he purchased a ladder. I think if I recall correctly, it was about a five foot tall type of ladder. But importantly, we did not find the ladder at the scene. So it's not clear that he used the ladder to get on top of the roof. 1:52:40 Christopher Wray: The weapon had a collapsible stock, which could explain why it might've been less easy for people to observe, because one of the things that we're finding is people have observed him. The first people to observe him with the weapon were when he was already on the roof, and we haven't yet found anybody with firsthand observation of him with the weapon walking around beforehand. 1:54:00 Christopher Wray: There were no pictures or videos on the drone of the day of the rally, for example. But we have been able to reverse engineer the flight path of the drone from the day of the rally, and that's how we know that for about 11 minutes from, I think it's around 3:50 PM to 4:00 PM, somewhere in that range, he was flying the drone and we have the flight path, and it's about 200 yards away from where former President Trump would ultimately be speaking. And so that would've primarily given him a vantage point. I'm trying to think how to describe this. If the former President's podium is that way, the drone would be over here looking, say 200 yards again, off this way, looking back, so it would've shown the shooter -- we think, again, we're still doing more work on this. I really want to qualify what I'm saying, but I'm trying to be transparent and lean in here -- we think it would've shown him kind of what would've been behind him. Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ): When you say behind him, behind the shooter. Christopher Wray: Correct. In other words, almost like giving him a rear view mirror of the scene behind him, except again, he wasn't flying it overhead while he was later back for the assassination. Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ): But he would've had, with the drone, he would've been able to also assess, because the stage, I assume, was already set, he'd be able to assess that angle with rooftop as well, forward and backward, I assume. Christopher Wray: Well, certainly going towards the podium, again, we're still trying to figure out exactly what he saw, because having to, in effect, because there's no recording of what he saw during those 11 minutes, our hypothesis at this point, the experts think he would've been live streaming it, and so we're trying to, in effect say, okay, well this was the flight pattern. Given these capabilities of the drone, what would you have seen? What could you have seen for those 11 minutes? And again, it wasn't over the stage or kind of the hub of the rally. It was about 200 yards away, but it looks like it would've been looking, let's say, the length of a football field or so more towards the podium. 1:56:25 Christopher Wray: So again, with the caveat that we're continued to do work on it, we believe that the first time he traveled to the grounds was I think a week before and he spent roughly 20 minutes there. Then he went to the grounds again on the morning of the event. It appears for about 70 minutes, I think. But again, I qualify that. I'd have to go back and look to be sure of that part. And then he came back in the afternoon. So that would be, I guess a third time for good. But that included things like this drone activity we just talked about. 1:58:10 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Have you been able to gain access to the shooter's electronic communications, social media, and -- with the caveats that you mentioned that the investigation is still early -- have you been able to make any deductions or are there any indications of the shooter's motivation from those electronic holdings? Christopher Wray: So in terms of our ability to access it, we have been able to get into and exploit a number of electronic devices, digital devices, but not all of them yet. And then within his various accounts, we've been able to get access to some of them, but some of them we're still waiting on. Some of them we may never get access to because of the encryption issue. It presents an increasingly vexing barrier for law enforcement, not just the FBI, but for law enforcement all over the country. 1:59:30 Christopher Wray: It does appear fairly clear that he was interested in public figures kind of more broadly, and I think this is important, that starting somewhere around July 6th or so, he became very focused on former President Trump, on this rally. And so one of the things that I can share here today that has not been shared yet is that we've just in the last couple of days, found that from our review, to your point about devices, analysis of a laptop, that the investigation ties to the shooter reveals that on July 6th he did a Google search for "how far away was Oswald from Kennedy." And so that search obviously is significant in terms of his state of mind. That is the same day that it appears that he registered for the Butler rally. 2:15:30 Christopher Wray: So I know it was a Secret Service counter sniper who took the shot that eliminated the shooter. 2:15:50 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): You mentioned that the would-be assassin bought a five foot ladder, you have credit card evidence of that. But it looks like on the scene there was a larger ladder that he might've used. Do you know which ladder he used to get to the roof? And do you have possession of that five foot ladder and the other ladder? And do you know how the taller ladder got to the scene? Christopher Wray: So this whole business about the ladder is something we're drilling into more. We do have possession of the five foot ladder that he purchased close in time to his attempted assassination that we've traced the purchase of that ladder from a receipt, a bloodied receipt that he had on him at the time his body was recovered on the roof. We do not yet know for sure how exactly he got up on the roof. We're looking at various forensic pieces to try to kind of piece that together. So more to come on that. Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): Do you know where the five foot ladder was found or retrieved? Was it near the roof or was it still in his vehicle? Christopher Wray: Neither. I don't have it in front of me, but I know that it was not, I know that it was not on scene and I know that it was not in his vehicle. 2:17:55 Christopher Wray: From everything we've seen, which is consistent with what we've learned in interviews, a lot of people describe him as a loner. That does kind of fit with what we're seeing in his devices. His list of contacts, for example, is very short compared to what you would normally see from most people. So it doesn't appear to be a whole lot of interaction between him, face-to-face or digital, with a lot of people. 3:00:50 Christopher Wray: We now believe that the subject climbed onto the roof using some mechanical equipment on the ground and vertical piping on the side of the AGR building. In other words, we do not believe he used a ladder to get up there. 3:07:25 Christopher Wray: He was a fairly, avid might be a little strong, but a fairly avid shooting hobbyist, and so he belonged to different clubs and went to certain ranges and that kind of thing. We do believe, based on what we've seen so far, that he went to a shooting range the day before and that he shot an AR-style rifle at that range the day before. I am not sure we know for sure that it's the weapon that he used, but I think we assessed that it probably is. July 23, 2024 House Committee on Homeland Security Witnesses: Colonel Christopher L. Paris, Commissioner, Pennsylvania State Police Patrick Yoes, National President, Fraternal Order of Police Clips Time stamps correspond to YouTube version 23:35 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Colonel Christopher Paris serves as the commissioner for the Pennsylvania State Police. In this role, he exercises command, administrative and fiscal authority over the Pennsylvania State Police, the 10th largest police agency in the United States. Commissioner Paris has served in the Pennsylvania State Police since his enlistment in 1999. 23:55 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Mr. Patrick Yoes currently serves as the president National Fraternal Order of Police. In this role, Mr. Yoes leads the order and its more than 367,000 law enforcement members in representing police officers in the profession. Prior to taking his current role, Mr. Yoes served an impressive 36 years as an active law enforcement officer. 25:45 Col. Christopher L. Paris: Prior to the shooting, our role was to support the Secret Service with personnel and assets that they requested. Our operation plan, completed to fulfill this responsibility consisted of 32 members, and we had two main responsibilities, a motorcade operation for the transportation with the Secret Service of former President Trump, as well as manning and staffing security posts inside the secure area of the Butler County Farm Show. Additionally, we provided two marked cars with uniformed troopers outside of the secure perimeter to provide roving duties, as the name implies, responding to incidents that may occur as a large gathering of people were moving to the venue. 1:22:10 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I would say from my experience and from state police operations to include this event as planned in our operations plan, we had integrated communications by having RPSP personnel in the Secret Service Command post. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): So your person was in there, in that command post on this event? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Yes, sir. 1:22:45 Col. Christopher L. Paris: There's a lot of talk about interoperability and communications. The state police, for example, operate our own statewide radio network, so we have the ability to, if we have an incident, a long protracted incident, for example, where we need to patch other agencies in, we have the capability to do that. However, Secret Service, for example, maintain some additional encrypted communications. So the best way to integrate unified command… Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Is physically present in the command site. Col. Christopher L. Paris: That would be our, yeah. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): That's how the Army does it and the military Col. Christopher L. Paris: I would expect our commanders to have personnel in there so that we could have radio communication, as well as a redundancy in the operations plan with a telephonic backup. 1:25:30 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The final walkthrough occurred on the 11th. Present at that meeting were the two commanders that were tasked with both staffing the security checkpoints on the interior of the secure perimeter, as well as the commander who was going to be in charge of the motorcade. But in addition to that, a PSP area commander was on that walkthrough, holding the rank of Major. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Could you share a little bit of insight? I appreciate the timeline, but could you share a little bit specific to the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: So on that walkthrough, our area commander asked specifically who was responsible for the AGR building, and we were told that Butler ESU was responsible for that area by several Secret Service agents on that walkthrough. 1:26:35 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): The slope of the roof, would that have prevented a sniper from being up there? Col. Christopher L. Paris I don't believe so, sir. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Okay. 1:29:40 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): President Yoes, in your comments, you talked about the need for communication. You talked about FirstNet. We have federal, state, and local law enforcement at an event like what we're talking about in Butler, but in our conversation with some of the locals, not state police, but the sheriff's department and the chief of police in Butler yesterday, those individuals did not have communication with state police or Secret Service. Would that, in your professional opinion, be a vulnerability for managing an event like this? Patrick Yoes: Well, I think we can go back to 9/11. When we identified at that time that the inoperability of different agencies to be able to communicate really was a hindrance. There's an infrastructure in place now to address these inoperabilities, but at the same time, they're not always utilized in every event. I do not have any direct knowledge whether that was the issue here, but I can tell you it is a common issue in law enforcement and an ability for our agencies not to be able to communicate, not that the technology is not necessarily there, it's because that they're not always incorporated. 1:31:10 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): Yeah, we passed legislation mandating, obviously, FirstNet interoperability, and we tied funding to make sure that that happens. But here we are looking at this situation and we picked up some valuable information that we are still not where we need to be on that. 1:32:25 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): Butler, Pennsylvania has no permitting process for events of that size, so you can announce it and hold it, and local government doesn't really have anything to do with it. And we were assured by local government that they would try to fix that. They said, we have to be more involved in events of this size, so that if this was not the best venue, then that permitting could have gotten engaged and suggested an alternate venue. 1:42:25 Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA): How many rounds did the shooter fire before he was killed? Do you know? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe that the number is eight casings have been recovered. 1:55:05 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Colonel Paris, are you aware whether any law enforcement officer or officers was or were posted in the second floor window of the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I am aware, yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): And what is the answer? Col. Christopher L. Paris: To my knowledge, there were two posted there from Butler ESU. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): And you said Butler ESU. What does the acronym ESU stand for? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Emergency Services Unit. It's a team that's comprised of multiple agencies that pool resources on a county or several county basis in order to enhance capabilities and training and be able to respond. Basically a mutual aid agreement is my understanding of it. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Is it sort of like a SWAT team? Col. Christopher L. Paris They are trained in SWAT tactics, to my knowledge, yes. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So how many ESU officers were posted to that second floor window? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I am aware that two were in the building, but again, I have not seen the Secret Service operations plan. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Do you know, you say in the building, were they in a window? A window out onto the scene? Col. Christopher L. Paris: From briefings that I have been given, I was told they were in a window, yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Did they remain on Post? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I was told that at a certain point they began searching along with other local officers in the immediacy after Crooks had been identified as suspicious by them. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): By them? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is that they identified Crooks for not matriculating. To my knowledge, Crooks never made it through the Secure Perimeter into the venue space itself. He was identified by those members as suspicious in part because of that. And then at some point he produced the range finder, which heightened that. 1:57:30 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Was it from this vantage point that those ESU officers spotted Crooks? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I don't know that particular window, but my understanding is from a second story window is where he was initially spotted. 1:57:45 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So are you then saying that, to your knowledge, those ESU officers left the location where they could look out the window to go in search of this person? Col. Christopher L. Paris: That is my understanding. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So sometime between the time he was spotted on the ground and identified as someone suspicious until the shooting, they had left that post to go look for him. Is that what you're saying? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is yes. Along with other municipal officers that responded to that area. And that's based on interviews that we've conducted. And I want to be very clear that I don't want to establish a timeline minute by minute because we don't have that yet. 2:35:40 Col. Christopher L. Paris: So this goes to my earlier qualifier about the timeline, but my understanding of the sequence of events is that he was determined to be suspicious as a result of behavior that he was exhibiting, milling around that area in front of the AGR building. There was a text thread that was going, I've been briefed, between the ESU members. They identified, they took a photo of him at some point. When he utilized the rangefinder, the suspicion was heightened. So I know at a certain point in the command post, a member of PSP received a phone call and a text message from members of ESU, and I know from an interview that that was immediately relayed in the command post to the Secret Service. 2:36:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: When the PSP member received that information and verbally turned right around, gave it to the Secret Service, our member was provided with a number to which the picture that had been taken by the Butler ESU members, or that was on that group thread, to which that should be sent. Our member did that, and our understanding was that was some element of the Secret Service. 2:37:50 Col. Christopher L. Paris: But at that point, just to be clear, he was determined to be suspicious. There was no information that he possessed a weapon. He was outside of that building where the ESU was posted. They were being vigilant. It's, I think, relevant that there were other people at the venue who were suspicious and reported likewise, in a close temporal nexus to that as well. 2:38:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe, again, I'll defer to when the President came out. I know that that was probably 20 to 25 minutes before 18:11 hours and steps were taken by the municipal officers over in that area, they were actively looking for Crooks. You saw the building yesterday. That's a pretty wide footprint. They began looking for him. There were scores of people making their way across that facility. Again, just for some context, there were over a hundred people that day requiring medical attention due to the heat. There was a missing 6-year-old. This individual was deemed to be suspicious because he was walking around and not moving into the venue. The rangefinder obviously heightened that, and they were attempting to locate him as people were moving across that space, who were attending the event, to the secure perimeter. 2:41:10 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): You said that many of your officers, or Butler ESU officers, were looking for Crooks. That was after that photograph was relayed to the Secret Service? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is it was after the photo was relayed to our trooper in the command post. And yes, Crooks was in that area around the building. My understanding is two additional municipal officers who were on a different post responded to that area and they began actively looking for Crooks. They circumscribed the building to try and locate him. It became apparent at some point that he was up on the roof. Those two municipal officers who responded then, to their credit, actively, once they realized that he was on the roof, one boosted the other one up hanging from the ledge of the roof. By the time that officer was boosted up on top of the roof, Crooks was on it almost in that final position that you saw. He had the AR out and he pointed it at the municipal officer who was suspended from the roof, who was not in a position, feet dangling at that point, to draw a weapon or continue hoisting himself back up on the roof. He drops back down from the roof, and at this point, I believe, that's when the video that's been widely circulated with people filming Crooks up on the roof saying there's somebody up on the roof. There were other law enforcement around the building running, but their vantage point on the ground did not lend a clear line of sight to where Crooks was at the top of that building. 2:44:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The hoisting up of the officer occurred probably no more -- again, I'm going to give you a time, but I want to just put it in context -- Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY) We understand it's not specific. Col. Christopher L. Paris: -- of a sequence of events. I would say at most two and a half to three minutes before that first shot rang out. 2:45:00 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The municipal officer saw Crooks. Crooks saw him, and Crooks turned and leveled the gun at him in a position tactically of extreme disadvantage, suspended in the air with your legs dangling after somebody had boosted you up. Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): And he let go, right? Col. Christopher L. Paris: He let go and he fell back down. 2:48:30 Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): Now emergency services noticed Thomas Crooks on the roof -- this is the timeline that we have -- took a picture and reported it. Who did they send that picture to? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Just to be clear, they were posted in the AGR building and took a picture of him. That's what you're referring to. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): Yes, who did they send the picture to? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I only know from interviews what I can confirm to my knowledge and belief here today, that a member of Pennsylvania State Police inside of the command post received that information telephonically and by text, relayed it to the Secret Service, and then was given a number to follow up on and that was based, again, heightened suspicion. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): How did they relay it to Secret Service? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe that they verbally turned and said in the command post, this is information that I just received. And then in follow up to that, as directed from the interview that I was briefed on, that was forwarded by text as requested by the Secret Service. 2:56:10 Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): Were there other folks who were also in the crowd identified as suspicious by law enforcement? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I have been briefed that yes, there were multiple individuals, which would be consistent with normal operations for a detail like this, that are identified as suspicious. Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): Can we take that as a single digit number of other folks? Col. Christopher L. Paris: The number that I was briefed on was single digit, but I can't say definitively that I was -- Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): What number were you briefed on, Colonel? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe I was briefed on an additional three individuals. 3:03:25 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I'm aware of three radio systems in operation: PSP's, the Secret Service, and Butler County's. Rep. Morgan Luttrell (R-TX): All communicating on different channels. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Technically, yes, but, I can only speak from PSP, our integration occurs by us having somebody inside of the Secret Service Command post. Again, for an incident of this magnitude, in theory, the more people you have on the same channel, if there was a medical emergency or a lost 6-year-old and everybody keys up at once, it paralyzes your communication. 3:14:45 Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): From the time that a law enforcement officer was hoisted up, was identified by the shooter, the shooter turns his rifle on him, how long between that encounter and the first shot? Col. Christopher L. Paris: So, I'm glad you asked me that question, Congressman. I'd like to clarify. So it was a matter of seconds. Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): Alright, because I think earlier it might've been minutes. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Correct, and I appreciate you asking that question, you allowing me to clarify that on the record. When I assigned that number, which again, I don't want get locked into a timeline, of three minutes before, that's probably a total amount of time that he was on the roof. When the one local officer hoisted the other one up and subsequently falls, releases himself after being faced with that -- Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): The shooter shuffles across the roof and takes his first shot -- Col. Christopher L. Paris: He's already, I believe, close to being in his final position there, and I'm told it's again, sequence of events, not a timeline based on the prior criteria laid out, but seconds after that is when the first shots rang out. 3:24:20 Patrick Yoes: There's no doubt when you look at how many people are involved in an operation like this, having everyone on one channel is difficult. But there are people within contained areas and their ability to be able to communicate as things change across platforms is crucial. In this case, we know that in seconds things unfolded and in seconds getting meaningful communication out to people who might be able to act on that communication is vital. So I think there's avenues here. I agree that not everyone should be on the same channel, but there are certain people within certain areas and perimeters that should be having communication or the ability to communicate a little more freer. 3:37:20 Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Now that you've had a chance to go back and look over it, what is the tallest structure on that site? Col. Christopher L. Paris: The water tower, sir. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Absolutely. Colonel, do you know how far the water tower was from the roof where the shooter took his shots? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): 160 yards, sir. Who made the decision, Colonel, not to put a counter sniper team on the tallest structure by far on the site with 360 degree surveillance? Do you have any idea? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know, sir. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Okay. We'd like to get that answer. 4:02:55 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Was Secret Service notified that they were leaving to go look for this guy and thus those eyes on top of the building gone? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know. And the other thing that I do not know is where else Butler ESU sent that information. I have not been briefed on that. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Who told them to go look? Do you know if they were told to go look? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know, sir. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): We just know that they did go look. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Yes, sir. And like I said, a very concerted effort with all of those alcoves and all of those buildings was made. There were two additional officers who, again, I don't know the specifics of the timeline, I don't know the specifics of the logistics of how that information was relayed, but I'm briefed that they came and they made a very concerted effort to try and locate Crooks. 4:12:05 Col. Christopher L. Paris My understanding is the two officers that responded and one hoisted up, the second one were not part of Butler ESU. They were two separate municipal officers who were tasked with a different responsibility. I would speculate, as an example, to say a traffic post or… Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Understood. Col. Christopher L. Paris: And they responded. I don't know, again, the specifics as to how they were alerted, but just to be clear, they were two separate. Yes, sir. 4:12:30 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): The Butler ESU officers who spotted Crooks, do I understand correctly, they spotted him from the second floor of the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: That is my understanding. Yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Okay. Were they posted there in order to maintain Overwatch on the roof, or were they generally assigned roving responsibility to be in the vicinity of that building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I can't answer that, and I would defer to the Secret Service. July 22, 2024 House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Witnesses: Kimberly Cheatle, [then] Director, United States Secret Service Clips Time stamps correspond to YouTube version 19:45 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): A little over a week ago, Americans watched in horror as a shooter attempted to assassinate President Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The gunman nearly succeeded. The bullet that struck President Trump's head was less than an inch from taking his life. President Trump survived, but one rallygoer, Corey Comparatore, tragically did not. Two others were seriously injured. It was a horrifying moment in American history. The horror was exceeded only by the bravery of the law enforcement agents who threw themselves in harm's way when shots were fired, the bravery of a crowd unwavering in its refusal to panic, and the bravery of a bloody President Trump refusing to run. 32:55 Kimberly Cheatle: Today we are joined by Kimberly Cheatle, who was sworn into office on September 17, 2022, as the Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior to her appointment, Director Cheatle was Senior Director of Global Security at PepsiCo. Before her role at Pepsi, she served 27 years in the Secret Service. 35:40 Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service's solemn mission is to protect our nation's leaders. On July 13th, we failed. As the Director of the United States Secret Service, I take full responsibility for any security lapse of our agency. We are fully cooperating with ongoing investigations. We must learn what happened, and I will move heaven and Earth to ensure that an incident like July 13th does not happen again. Let me state unequivocally, nothing I have said should be interpreted to place blame for this failure on our federal, state, or local law enforcement partners who supported the Secret Service in Butler. We could not do our job without them. 37:05 Kimberly Cheatle: I will be transparent as possible when I speak with you. Understanding, though, at times, that I may be limited in providing a thorough response in this open setting due to associated risks with sharing highly sensitive protective methodologies. 38:30 Kimberly Cheatle: The comprehensive advance process involves collaborative planning between our Secret service, the protectee's staff, and local law enforcement partners. The level of security provided for the former President increased well before the campaign and has been steadily increasing as threats evolve. The security plan included a full assessment of the Butler Farm Show grounds to identify security vulnerabilities and craft a security plan for the protectee, attendees, and the public. Immediately following the assassination attempt, I directed the activation of my crisis center. I assembled my executive team to begin surging more protective resources to the former President and to ensure the wellness of our people post-incident, all while securing an active crime scene. I immediately ordered a reevaluation of the Republican National Convention Security Plan, and I increased the security posture in the National Capitol Region for all permanent protectees and sites. At the same time, I initiated a Mission assurance investigation within our agency. 41:40 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Let's start with the building that the shooter used to shoot President Trump from. At any point Saturday, did the Secret Service have an agent on top of that roof? Kimberly Cheatle: Sir, as I'm sure you can imagine that we are just nine days out from this incident and there's still an ongoing investigation, and so I want to make sure that any information that we are providing to you is factual. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): You can't, okay. Can you answer why the Secret Service didn't place a single agent on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: We are still looking into the advanced process and the decisions that were made. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Okay, okay. Wasn't that building within the perimeter that should be secured? Do we agree with that? Kimberly Cheatle: The building was outside of the perimeter on the day of the visit, but again, that is one of the things that during the investigation, we want to take a look at and determine whether or not other decisions should have been made. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): One of the things that you said, I believe in an interview, that there wasn't an agent on the roof because it was a sloped roof. Is that normal? And do you fear that that immediately creates an opportunity for future would-be assassins to look for a slanted roof? I mean, this is a huge question that every American has. Why wasn't a Secret Service agent on the roof? And there have been reports that agents were supposed to be on the roof, but it was hot that day and they didn't want to be on the roof. Can you answer any of those questions, Director? Kimberly Cheatle: So I appreciate you asking me that question. Chairman. I should have been more clear in my answer. When I spoke about where we placed personnel in that interview, what I can tell you is that there was a plan in place to provide Overwatch, and we are still looking into responsibilities and who was going to provide Overwatch, but the Secret Service in general, not speaking specifically to this incident, when we are providing Overwatch, whether that be through counter snipers or other technology, prefer to have sterile rooftops. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Did the Secret Service use any drones for surveillance that day? Kimberly Cheatle: So again, I'm not going to get into specifics of that day in itself, but there are times during a security plan that the Secret Service does deploy an asset like a drone. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): There were reports that the shooter used a drone just a few hours before the rally start time. Is that accurate? Kimberly Cheatle: I have heard those same reports. And again, am waiting for the final report. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): If you can't answer the question, that's your answer. But can you answer this? Do you know, I'm not asking yes or no, but do you know if the shooter used a drone before the shooting? Kimberly Cheatle: That information has been passed to us from the FBI. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): How many Secret Service agents were assigned to President Trump on the day of the rally? Kimberly Cheatle: Again, I'm not going to get into the specifics of the numbers of personnel that we had there, but we feel that there was a sufficient number of agents assigned. 46:05 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Before July 13th, had the Trump detail requested additional resources? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that for the event on July 13th, the assets that were requested for that day were given. 46:25 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): It's been reported that before former President Trump got up on the stage at around 6:00 PM on Saturday, July 13th, that the local police had identified and even photographed a man who was acting suspiciously. And this man, who turned out to be the gunman, had been flagged as a potential threat. Is that accurate? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can say is that the individual was identified as suspicious. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So he was known to be suspicious before former President Trump took the stage. Kimberly Cheatle: That is the information I have received. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): Why was he allowed to take the stage with a suspicious person having been identified in the crown? Kimberly Cheatle: So I appreciate the question, and I'd like to make two points. If the detail had been passed information that there was a threat, the detail would never have brought the former president out onto stage. That is what we do and that is who we are. We are charged with protecting all of our protectees. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So you distinguish between someone who is suspicious and someone who's threatening. Is that right? Kimberly Cheatle: We do. There are a number of times at protective events where suspicious people are identified and those individuals have to be investigated and determined what is it that identifies that person as suspicious? 47:45 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): Did you deny a request for additional resources that had been made by the Trump campaign? Kimberly Cheatle: There were no assets denied for that event in Butler on the 13th. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): I see. So you're saying there were requests made for additional assistance for other specific events, rather than for the campaign as a whole. Is that right? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm sorry, I'm not understanding. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): You seem to say that there were not additional resources requested for that event. And forgive me for being unfamiliar with this. Is it requested event-by-event or is it requested just in general for the campaign? Kimberly Cheatle: So if I can explain the advance process. When an event or an venue is identified by, in this case, campaign staff, then the campaign staff works together with Secret Service agents who go out and conduct an advance. Generally that is a five day time period where those discussions are had about what the perimeter is going to look like, what the size of the event is, what the venue is, and then from there there is a request made to mitigate potential risk and threat. And I'm saying that on that day, the requests that were pushed forward were granted. 49:00 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So the Secret Service did not know that the gunman actually had a weapon before President Trump was allowed to get up on the stage. Kimberly Cheatle: To the best of our knowledge and the facts that we have at this point, that is correct. 49:50 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): It's been reported that the shooter was not carrying a driver's license or any form of identification. They had no idea who he was, but then he was quickly identified, I think within 30 minutes, by using the serial number on the AR-15 under a tracing system that is now controversial. Some people say we should get rid of it, some people want to keep it. But is that right, that the serial number was the key information which led to the identification of the shooter? Kimberly Cheatle: That is my understanding, sir. Yes. 52:50 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): How many times did you turn them down ahead of that? Kimberly Cheatle: I think that it is important to distinguish between what some people may view as a denial of an asset or a request -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well, Mr. Guglielmi, your spokesperson, he said he acknowledged the Secret Service had turned down some requests. I'm asking how many. Kimberly Cheatle: A denial of a request does not equal a vulnerability. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well, tell me what it is. Kimberly Cheatle: There are a number of ways that threats and risks can be mitigated with a number of different assets, whether that be through personnel, whether that be through technology or other resources. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well tell the committee which it was. They asked for additional help in some form or another. You told them no. How many times did you tell them no? And what'd you tell them no to? Kimberly Cheatle: Again, I cannot speak to specific incidents, but I can tell you in general terms the Secret Service is judicious with their resources based on -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): What does some requests mean? How many times? Requests is plural. So more than once they ask for additional help and you turned them down. What did they ask for and how many times did you turn them down? Pretty basic questions. Kimberly Cheatle: So again, without having all of the details in front of me, sir, what I can tell you is that there are times when -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): You didn't get briefed on how many times you turned down the Trump detail when they asked for additional help? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm sorry. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Didn't get briefed on that before you came to this hearing, knowing you were going to get asked that question? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that in generic terms, when details make a request, there are times that there are alternate ways to cover off on that threat. 1:04:05 Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Cheatle, have you read the intelligence of the generalized threat to Donald Trump by Iran as a result of their desire to retaliate for the killing of Soleimani? Kimberly Cheatle: I have. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Have you read or been briefed about the intelligence of the specific recent threat to Donald Trump from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I have. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Wray, when we were getting our briefing, indicated that he thought the threat assessment should have included this threat from Iran. Is it your testimony today that the threat assessment, since you've read this intelligence, was sufficient to protect him from this threat from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: My testimony today is that the information that we had at the time was known, that -- Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Was it sufficient, Director Cheatle? Was it sufficient for the Iranian threat that you said you have read the intelligence briefings for? Kimberly Cheatle: That information was passed to -- Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Well, I'm not asking the bureaucratic issue of who did it get passed around to. Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the specific and generalized threat to Donald Trump's life from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I do believe it was. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Cheadle, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a 20-year-old? Kimberly Cheatle: Sir, I think we've acknowledged that there was gaps and a failure that day. 1:09:15 Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): There were some reports that the individual had a rangefinder. That would certainly raise my suspicion. Did he have a rangefinder? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, he did. But may I explain that at a number of our sites, especially when you're at outdoor venues, a rangefinder is not a prohibited item. It is sometimes an item that is brought in by individuals if you're going to be in the back. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Did anybody confront him on that? Anybody ask him questions? What are you doing with the rangefinder? Anybody confront him on his presence where he was in proximity to the President? Kimberly Cheatle: So again, to my knowledge, I believe that that was the process that was taking place, was to locate the individual. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Did they confront him? Did they go up to him? Did they talk to him? Kimberly Cheatle: I do not have those details at this time. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Yeah, those are important details. 1:10:40 Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): There was considerable delay in removing the president from the podium after the shooting began. He got shot in the ear, and it was still over a minute before he was removed from the stage. Meanwhile, this shooter had multiple clips. Several clips. He got off eight shots, and he had the capacity and the ability, if he was not neutralized, to basically mow down that whole Secret Service detachment as well as the President. What, from your own investigation, caused that delay under the circumstances. Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that when the agents identified that the shooting was taking place, in under three seconds they threw themselves on top of the -- Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): I understand that. There was heroism there. No question about it. No question about it. But protocol would indicate, and these are the opinions of various former Secret Service agents, people who have done this work in the past, that over a minute of exposure on that podium, with a shooter with a high-capacity weapon, who had already wounded the President and could have got off we don't know how many more rounds, and yet the President remained exposed even though he was joined in that exposure by the Secret Service in their heroic acts. I dunno if there's a good explanation for that. Kimberly Cheatle: Our personnel created a body bunker on top of the President, shielding him. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): I get that. Yeah. This was an AR 15 style weapon that would've made pretty quick work if he was determined and able to do so. 1:13:00 Kimberly Cheatle: As of today, the Secret Service has just over 8,000 employees. We continue to hire knowing that we need to ensure that we keep pace with a -- Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): What would be the full compliment that you're looking for? You've got 8,000 and how many would be a full complement for the service? Kimberly Cheatle: So we are still striving towards a number of 9,500 employees, approximately, in order to be able to meet future and emerging needs. 1:25:15 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): When this guy took the shots, he climbed a ladder to get on the roof, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm unable to answer details of exactly how the individual accessed the roof at this time. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Do you know if he did use the ladder? Do you know when the ladder was placed there? Was the ladder there two days before? Just the night before? Do you have any information at all as to when the ladder got there? Kimberly Cheatle: I would like to be able to answer those questions. The FBI is still conducting an investigation. 1:25:20 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Were President Trump's normal agents, normally assigned to him, there that day? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): These were the same agents that were always there? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, sir. The people that are assigned to his detail were working on that day. 1:30:45 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): As you know, the shooter began shooting at 6:11 PM Eastern on July 13th. NBC reported that at 5:51 PM, 20 minutes before the shooting began, the State Police informed the Secret Service of their concern. Now, the rally was not paused at that point, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: No. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And according to NBC, just two minutes later, at 5:53 PM, the Secret Service notified its snipers about the gunman. The rally wasn't paused at that point either, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: No. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Let me show you some video footage by rally goers. If you could play the video on the screen up here. This was taken two minutes before the shooting started. If you could turn up the volume. Rally goers: Right up here, he's on the roof. Right there, right on the roof. He's standing up now. Right on the roof. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Ma'am, that doesn't look like suspicious behavior. That looks like threatening behavior to me. And the rally wasn't paused at that point either, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I can tell you, as I stated earlier, sir, that the moment that the shift surrounding the President were aware of an actual threat. -- Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): That's a threat, right there. The guy's on the roof and everybody's yelling at him and directing the officer's attention to him. The rally was not paused at that point, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: We are currently still combing through communications and when communications were passed. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Well, I can point you to this communication. It's two minutes before the shots started ringing out. Director Cheatle, yes or no, was there ever a moment where the Secret Service actually considered pausing the rally? Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service would've paused the rally had they known or -- Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): So the answer is no -- Kimberly Cheatle: -- been told there was an actual threat. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): The answer is no, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I can speak to you in generalities. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): No, no. I don't want generalities. I want specifics. The answer is no, you did not consider pausing the rally, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: The people that are in charge of protecting the President on that day would never bring the former President out if there was a threat that had been identified. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Well, they did because we've now identified three points in the 20 minutes before the shooting that the threat emerged. Let me point you to something else, which is the building that the shooter was perched on, seen here. This building is called the AGR building. I'm sure that you're familiar with it. It's no more than 150 yards from the stage where Donald Trump stood. Yet the security perimeter was drawn such that the AGR building was placed outside of it. Director Cheatle, according to the Washington Post, the AR 15-style rifle used in the shooting had a range of 400 to 600 yards, and therefore the AGR building was clearly within rifle range of the stage, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): NBC News has reported that in the days before the rally, the Secret Service had identified the building as a vulnerability that required special attention, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: That's reporting from NBC? Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Yes. Kimberly Cheatle: So I am still looking into an active investigation. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): I know, but it's been nine days. I mean, you should know that, right? And yet, despite the fact that the AGR building was in rifle range of the stage, and it was flagged as a vulnerability, this building was put outside of the Secret Service's security perimeter. And I respectfully submit, the Secret Service must expand its security perimeter to account for the kinds of weapons that can be used outside the perimeter to endanger the protectees inside the perimeter. 1:34:50 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): First, you have not found evidence that the incident was a stage shooting, right? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And you haven't found evidence that this was a result of a conspiracy of high ranking government officials, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And you have not found evidence that this incident was in fact directed or perpetrated by a foreign state or entity, right? Kimberly Cheatle: Not at this time. 1:58:15 Rep. Pete Sessions (R-TX): Have any employees been disciplined for their role in the Butler, PA incident? Kimberly Cheatle: No, sir. Not at this time. I am asking those questions. 2:01:30 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): It's been nine days, every American wants these questions answered. Do you have a ballpark estimate of when what Mr. Sessions asked you would be able to answer, time wise? Kimberly Cheatle: I can tell you on our mission assurance internal investigation, we are targeting to have that completed within 60. 2:02:10 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Director Cheatle, respectfully, what you had just laid out about 60 days. We are currently in the midst of an especially concentrated presidential campaign in the moment that is also paired with, of course, elections happening across the country that are happening in about a hundred days. So the notion of a report coming out in 60 days when the threat environment is so high in the United States, irrespective of party, is not acceptable. 2:03:55 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Director Cheatle, is there a standard perimeter that the Secret Service establishes around an event, or are those perimeters independently determined per event and scenario? Kimberly Cheatle: There is no standard. Every event and every venue is different and treated as such. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): So each event has a different perimeter that is established depending on the logistics of that event. Now, you established earlier that the building upon which the shooter operated from was outside of that established perimeter, correct, for the Butler Pennsylvania event? Kimberly Cheatle: It was outside of our secure perimeter, yes. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Now, that building was, I believe, 500....How far away was that building from the President? Kimberly Cheatle: It was approximately 200 yards. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): 200 yards. Now, the individual used an AR 15 in order to act out his assassination attempt, an AR 15 has a range of about 400 to 600 yards. My question is, why is the Secret Service Protective perimeter shorter than one of the most popular semi-automatic weapons in the United States? Kimberly Cheatle: There are a number of weapons out there with a number of ranges. Again, an advance was completed. The determination of the perimeter, I'm not going to speak to specifics, but there are a number of factors that are taken into account when we determine our perimeter. Some of it has to do with terrain, some of it has to do with buildings, some of it has to do with assets and resources that are available. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): And so what I'm hearing is that a perimeter was not established outdoors in an outdoor venue that would prevent an AR 15, which is one of the most common weapons used in mass shootings, from being able to be within the range of Secret Service protection. Kimberly Cheatle: A perimeter was established, and even though there were buildings that were outside of that perimeter, it wasn't just that building. There were a number of buildings in the area and there was Overwatch that was created to help mitigate some of those buildings. 2:32:45 Rep. Melanie Stansbury (D-NM): I want to talk a little bit about the timeline. Now, here's what we know, and I know, Director, you were also on the call that we had a few days ago with the FBI and other law enforcement. So I respect that you are not able to share based on your testimony, some of the details that are currently being investigated, but I know you were on the call because I heard you on the call and you heard them too. So I'm going to lay out the timeline a little bit. On July 3rd, the rally was announced that it was going to be in Butler. On July 6th, three days later, we know that the shooter searched for dates for Trump and DNC events. On July 7th, so this is four days after the announcement, the shooter went to the site. He actually physically went to the site. On July 12th, the shooter went to a gun range where he and his dad regularly go and practiced shooting. And the next day, on July 13th, he went to the site again before the rally began. We know that he then went and searched online for a gun store, where he went and he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition, went home, got his father's AR, which was legally purchased, and returned to the venue at 5:00 PM that evening. This is more than an hour before Donald Trump actually took the stage that evening. Local law enforcement we're made aware that there was a suspicious man. In fact, at 5:20, local law enforcement flagged that he had a rangefinder and they radioed their concerns and sent around pictures of the individual. At 5:40, 20 minutes before local law enforcement actually identified the shooter and at 5:51 Secret Service was notified of the suspicious person by the state police. And one minute later, they distributed that information. That was before Donald Trump even took the stage. That was 11 minutes before he took the stage. So the Secret Service was aware that there was a suspicious person. At 6:03 he took the stage. At 6:09, rally goers, as was shown in the video, identified this gentleman climbing on the roof. At 6:11, three shots were heard, three rounds of shots, and of course the president and the other victims were shot. 2:48:35 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So given that there was an increased threat to President Trump's life, was he provided a full security compliment akin to what a sitting US President would receive? Kimberly Cheatle: He was provided a full compliment of security based on the threat assessment that we had and the venue. Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): That's not my question. My question is, if he'd been the sitting President, would he have had the same security he had on July 13th or would it have been beefed up? Kimberly Cheatle: There is a difference between the sitting President -- Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So your answer is, he didn't. Kimberly Cheatle: -- and continuity of government and the responsibility that we had -- Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So he did not, okay. There wasn't a full CAT team on site. There wasn't countersurveillance teams on site. 2:49:25 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): Have you visited the site? Kimberly Cheatle: No, I have not. 2:50:30 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): You said, do you remember, in an ABC interview you did, that you didn't have people on the roof of the AGR building because you were worried about safety because of the slope? Kimberly Cheatle: I recall that statement. Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): Okay. Does the Secret Service have written policy you can share with us about sloped roofs? Kimberly Cheatle: No. 2:54:00 Kimberly Cheatle: So again, I think we're talking about the distinction between suspicious behavior and a threat, and at the time that this individual was identified, they were displaying suspicious behavior. I'm still waiting for interviews from the FBI to determine what it was that identified that individual as suspicious and what those behaviors were. 2:55:05 Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA): When there are so many teams that are collaborating, who takes the lead, and how is that determined? Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service is responsible for the security of the site and the coordination. Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA): And that was the case on July 13th? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. 3:06:25 Kimberly Cheatle: I acknowledge that we are unaware at this time how the individual was able to access the roof. 3:06:35 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): Overwatch meaning from other counter-sniper or other higher points. Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. 3:06:50 Kimberly Cheatle: I don't have the timeline of how the individual accessed the roof, where they accessed the roof, or how long they were on the roof. 3:13:40 Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA): Was Crook's vehicle inside any of your perimeters? Kimberly Cheatle: No, it was not. Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA): It was not. Was there a device located on Mr. Crook's body to detonate the vehicle? Kimberly Cheatle: That is the information that I have. 3:26:05 Kimberly Cheatle: The allocation of resources is decided based on the availability of personnel and their location and where they are, but there were sufficient resources that were given to the former President's event that day. Rep. William Timmons (R-SC): What did you just say? Did you just say there were sufficient resources? President Trump got shot. 3:32:05 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Were agents or officers inside the building? If so, what floor were they on? Kimberly Cheatle: We had local police officers inside the building. 3:59:30 Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Have you been in communication with the FBI? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I have. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): With whom? Kimberly Cheatle: I speak with the Director and the Deputy Director. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Okay. And what have they shared with you about this investigation? So I'll give you an opportunity to answer again. Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: They have shared with me the -- Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Did they share with you how many shell casing were on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Okay. How many were there? Kimberly Cheatle: I would refer to the FBI for their investigation. 4:13:20 Kimberly Cheatle: There are a number of other agencies that provide assistance to the Secret Service. During campaigns, we utilize personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, we utilize personnel from the Department of Defense, and we utilize local law enforcement partners. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Are you on the same radios? Do you provide the radios to all the assets that are taking part in protection of an event? Kimberly Cheatle: We provide radios to the personnel from the Department of Homeland Security that are assisting us. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): But not local law enforcement? Kimberly Cheatle: Local law enforcement is working on their own radios. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Are you on the same frequency? Kimberly Cheatle: We ensure that we have counterparts in the security room, and so the local law enforcement will place one of their personnel in the security room with our personnel so that we have interoperability communications. 4:14:25 Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Was Mr. Crooks observed at the AGR building prior to the shooting? Kimberly Cheatle: He was observed on the grounds outside of our perimeter prior to the shooting. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): At approximately what time was that? You don't have to give me the specific minute, but at approximately what time was that? Kimberly Cheatle: I believe it was about 45 minutes or so prior to [the shooting]. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Did the sniper team take a photo of Mr. Crooks? Kimberly Cheatle: The local team did, yes. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): So it was a local team and not a Secret Service sniper. Kimberly Cheatle: That took the photo. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Okay. And did he relay that photo to Central Command? Kimberly Cheatle: Again, it's an active ongoing investigation, so I want to make sure that I'm factual with the route that that photo took and who that was disseminated to and when. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Did Mr. Crook's status go from a person that was under suspicion to a threat? When did that happen? And maybe not even a specific time, director Cheatle, maybe a certain event that happened that transformed him from a person of suspicion to a threat. When did that happen? Kimberly Cheatle: To the best of my knowledge, based on what I've been told thus far, it's approximately five minutes to where individuals relayed that there was an issue being worked at the three o'clock of the President. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): But it was before the shots were fired. Kimberly Cheatle: That is correct. But again, it was not phrased as a threat. It was just that something was being worked. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Yeah, but my question is, when did he transform from suspicion to threat? Because they're treated very differently. People can be suspicious, but they're not a threat until a certain point in time. So when did that happen? Kimberly Cheatle: I believe that it was seconds before the gunfire started. Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): Seconds. 4:18:40 Kimberly Cheatle: At this time we do not have that there were any other people engaged. Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): So you believe he was acting alone? Kimberly Cheatle: I do. July 20, 2017 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Communications Witnesses: Curtis Brown, Deputy Secretary of Public Safety & Homeland Security, State of Virginia Dr. Damon Darsey, Professor, University of Mississippi Medical Center Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability Office Chris Sambar, Senior Vice President, AT&T FirstNet Michael Poth, CEO, FirstNet Clips 6:37 Sen. Brian Schatz (D-HI): With FirstNet, firefighters will be able to download the blueprint of a burning building before they enter; a police officer arriving at a scene can run a background check or get pictures of a suspect by accessing a federal law enforcement database; most importantly, emergency personnel will not be competing with commercial users for bandwidth. They will have priority on this network, which will be built and hardened to public-safety specifications. It will have rugged eyes and competitive devices and specify public-safety applications. September 29, 2005 House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet Witnesses: David Boyd, Director, SAFECOM Program, Department of Homeland Security Department Timothy Roemer, Director, Center for National Policy; Member, 9/11 Commission Art Botterell, Emergency Information Consultant Clips 1:43:00 Timothy Roemer: Let me give you a couple examples of what the 9/11 Commission found as to some of these problems. We found all kinds of compelling instances of bravery and courage, people going into burning buildings and rescuing people. They might have rescued more. We might have saved more of the fire department chiefs, officers, police officers, emergency personnel, if they would have had public-radio spectrum to better communicate. At 9:59 in the morning on 9/11 four years ago, a general evacuation order was given to firefighters in the North Tower. The South Tower had collapsed. A place that held up to 25,000 people had been diminished to cement, steel, and ash. The people, then, in the North Tower, many of the chiefs in the lobby, didn’t even know that the other tower had collapsed, or else they might have been able to get more people out more quickly. We had comments from people saying such things as, we didn’t know it had collapsed. Somebody actually said, Mr. Chairman, that people watching TV had more information than we did in the lobby on 9/11 in the North Tower. People on TV in Florida or California knew more than our first responders on site in New York City. Music by Editing Production Assistance